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Abstract: Since the first handheld cellular phone was introduced in 1970s, the mobile phone has changed
significantly both in terms of popularity and functionality. With more than 4.6 billion subscribers around the world, it
has become a ubiquitous device in our daily life. Apart from the traditional telephony and text messaging services,
people are enjoying a much wider range of mobile services over a variety of network connections in the form of
mobile applications. Although a number of security mechanisms such as authentication, antivirus, and firewall
applications are available, it is still difficult to keep up with various mobile threats (i.e. service fraud, mobile malware
and SMS phishing); hence, additional security measures should be taken into consideration. This paper proposes a
novel behaviour-based profiling technique by using a mobile user’s application usage to detect abnormal mobile
activities. The experiment employed the MIT Reality dataset. For data processing purposes and also to maximise the
number of participants, one month (24/10/2004-20/11/2004) of users’ application usage with a total number of 44,529
log entries was extracted from the original dataset. It was further divided to form three subsets: two intra-application
datasets compiled with telephone and message data; and an inter-application dataset containing the rest of the
mobile applications. Based upon the experiment plan, a user’s profile was built using either static and dynamic
profiles and the best experimental results for the telephone, text message, and application-level applications were an
EER (Equal Error Rate) of: 5.4%, 2.2% and 13.5% respectively. Whilst some users were difficult to classify, a
significant proportion fell within the performance expectations of a behavioural biometric and therefore a behaviour
profiling system on mobile devices is able to detect anomalies during the use of the mobile device. Incorporated
within a wider authentication system, this biometric would enable transparent and continuous authentication of the
user, thereby maximising user acceptance and security.
Keywords: mobile device, behaviour profiling, applications, transparent authentication

1. Introduction
The modern mobile handheld device is capable of providing many services through a wide range of
applications over multiple networks as well as on the handheld itself, such as: voice calling through
service provider’s network, Internet surfing via Wi-Fi hotspots, video conferencing through a 3G
connection, road navigating by GPS (Global Positioning System), picture sharing by using Bluetooth
pairing, data synchronising with laptop/desktop computers, document creation and modification, and
entertainment (i.e. playing music). Indeed, the functionality and interconnectivity of mobile devices only
tends to increase with time.
While people enjoy the convenience provided by mobile devices, there are also threats which could make
their life less comfortable, such as the loss or theft of the device, service fraud, SIM (Subscriber Identity
Module) card cloning, mobile malware, information disclosure, DoS (Denial-of-Service) attacks, Smishing
(SMS (Short Message Service) phishing) and Vishing (Voice phishing). Mobile malware could harm the
mobile phone in a variety of ways, such as: infecting files and damaging user data. Since discovered in
2004, there are more than 106 malware families with 514 variants having been identified (Securelist
2010). Smishing and Vishing are new types of phishing attacks which are performed by utilising text
messaging and telephone calls (FBI 2010). If the phone owner is fooled, its personal information can be
exposed and abused.
With the aim to counter mobile threats, a number of security mechanisms have been developed both on
the mobile device and the service provider’s network. The PIN (Personal Identification Number) based
authentication method is the most widely deployed approach on mobile devices. Although widely used,
many users do not employ the technique properly (i.e. never changing the PIN) (Clarke and Furnell 2005;
Kurkovsky and Syta 2010). Mobile antivirus software and firewall applications are mainly deployed for
detecting malware presence and blocking unwanted network traffic. Nonetheless, obtaining the latest
virus signatures and updating rules for network traffic are not easy tasks; furthermore, their ability to
detect user related activities is limited. As a mobile device has limited computing power, more
sophisticated mechanisms, such as IDS (Intrusion Detection System), are primarily deployed on the
service provider’s network. These systems monitor the mobile users’ calling and migration activities to
detect telephony service fraud. However, given the modern mobile device has the ability to access
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several networks simultaneously and accommodate a wide range of services, existing network-based
security mechanisms are unable to provide comprehensive protection for the mobile handset. This paper
focuses upon presenting the findings from a feasibility study into utilising a host-based behavioural
profiling approach to identify mobile device misuse, and providing continued and transparent protection
for mobile devices.
This paper begins by introducing various mobile device applications, mobile threats, and general security
mechanisms and continues to describe the current state-of-the-art. A series of experimental studies on
two aspects of user’s applications usage (application-level and application-specific) are presented in
Section 3, with the following section describing the results. The paper then proceeds to discuss the
results and conclude with highlighting the future direction of the research.

2. Behaviour-based mobile device security mechanisms
Research in mobile device security has been an established area for more than 10 years with a
substantial amount of activity focused upon the areas of authentication, antivirus, firewalls, and IDS. Of
particular interest however is the research that has been undertaken in behaviour-based mechanisms.
This research falls primarily into two categories: behaviour-based network and behaviour-based host
mechanisms.

2.1 Behaviour-based network mobile security mechanisms
The research for studying mobile behaviour-based mechanisms started around 1995 mainly focusing
upon the area of IDS. These mobile IDSs monitor user calling and migration behaviour over the service
provider’s network, and detect telephony service fraud (Gosset 1998; Samfat and Molva 1997;
Boukerche and Nitare 2002). One particularly successful approach is based upon developing a profile of
users calling history over a period of time and comparing this historical profile against current usage, with
deviations above a predefined threshold resulting in an alarm. Various supervised and unsupervised
classifiers were successfully developed to deal with various attributes of the problem-space (known and
unknown attack vectors) and the resulting systems were combined so that the strengths of each
approach can be capitalised upon (Gosset 1998).
Research has also focused on the use of geo-location information as a basis for detecting misuse. Based
upon the hypothesis that people have a predictable travelling pattern, the migration based mobile IDS
monitors a user’s location activities to detect abnormal behaviour. The user’s location information can be
obtained either from the mobile cellular network (i.e. cell ID) or via a GPS link (i.e. longitude, latitude). By
recording the users’ location information over a time period, a mobility profile can be generated. When a
mobile user carries their device from one location to another, the probability of the event will be
calculated. If this surpasses a threshold, then the current event will be considered as an intrusion. A
number of studies have been carried out by profiling user migration activities, such as: Buschkes et al
1998, Hall et al 2005, and Sun et al 2006.
By studying a user’s calling or location activities, behaviour based IDSs can achieve a high detection rate
and offer the ability to detect unforeseen attacks. In addition, as the classification and identification
procedures are processed by the network service provider, it does not require any additional
computational power from the mobile device. This has traditionally been critical for mobile devices, as
they have limited processing power and space comparing with traditional desktop computers.
Nonetheless, if these behaviour-based systems work together to monitor the mobile user’s action (i.e.
calling a friend) while knowing where the action is taken (i.e. at home), an overall system performance
could arguably be increased.

2.2 Behaviour-based host mobile security mechanisms
Existing host behaviour-based mobile security systems are mainly authentication-based systems. These
systems usually employ one or more characteristics of a user’s behaviour to assess the legitimacy of the
current user – techniques include keystroke analysis and gait recognition.
Keystroke analysis based authentication systems monitor users’ keystroke patterns, typically monitoring
the inter-keystroke latency and hold-time. The authentication can be performed in two modes: static (text
dependent) and dynamic (text independent). In the static mode, users will be authenticated when a
specific word or phrase has been entered. For instance, the system will authenticate the user when they
enter a PIN to unlock their mobile devices. In the dynamic mode, a user’s legitimacy will be checked
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based upon their typing speed and rhythm independent of what they type. For example, authentication
will transparently occur while the user composes a text message. Previous work in this area include
Clarke and Furnell (2006), Buchoux and Clarke (2008), and Campisi et al. (2009). With an average
experimental EER of 13%, keystroke analysis based authentication systems can be deployed in practice
to provide extra security for a mobile device. However, this method is only practical in scenarios with
sufficient keystroke activity (i.e. activities such as reading a document or viewing a picture would be
unlikely to generate sufficient data to successfully validate a users’ identity).
Gait recognition is based upon the theory that people can be discriminated by how people walk when
they carry their mobile device (Boyd and Little, 2005). When a user carries their mobile device in their
trouser pocket, the user’s gait information can be collected (Derawi et al 2010). The user’s gait data can
then be compared with an existing template. If it matches, the user is considered legitimate; otherwise,
they are an intruder. The experiment result shows that an EER of 20.1% can be achieved. It shows the
possibility to deploy this method on a mobile handset. However, as the authentication process is heavily
reliant on user’s gait information, this could leave the mobile device unprotected when gait information is
not available – for example when the user sits in the office.

2.3 Summary of current mobile behaviour security mechanisms
The aforementioned literature suggests that existing behaviour-based network IDSs can detect calling
service fraud attacks. However, in practice it can be seen that the mobile network operator can only
monitor calling and migration behaviours, rather than examining every single mobile service. For the
existing host-based behaviour authentication system, it could only provide periodically security when the
user interacts with the device in the desired manner (e.g. when the keypad is touched or the device is
carried in the back pocket). Therefore, none of the current research in mobile behaviour security
mechanisms provides a comprehensive and continuous protection against device misuse. Hence, a
mobile security mechanism which can offer detection across a wider range of services and connections
on the mobile device is needed.

3. Behaviour profiling for transparent authentication for mobile devices
The previous section shows that the network-based behavioural security mechanisms can only monitor
network-based services through the service provider’s network. As current mobile devices have the
ability to access multiple networks simultaneously, a host based approach must be taken into
consideration when designing the new system. With the difficulty of obtaining and updating the signatures
and the lack of the ability to detect unforeseen threats, a behaviour profiling technique should be taken.
As application usage represents an overview of how the user interacts with the device (Miettinen et al
2006), and due to the lack of research regarding the discriminatory nature of application usage within a
mobile device environment, an experiment was developed focussing upon two aspects: application-level
and application-specific user interactions.

3.1 Experiment procedure
The experiment employed a publicly available dataset provided by the MIT Reality Mining project (Eagle
et al 2009). The dataset contains 106 participants’ mobile phone activities from September 2004 to June
2005. By using preinstalled logging software, various mobile data attributes were collected from
participants’ using Nokia 6600 mobile phones. As shown in Table 1, the MIT Reality dataset contains a
large and varied selection of information which covers two levels of application usage: application-level
information (general applications) and application-specific information (voice call and Text message).
Table 1: The MIT Reality dataset
Activity

Number of logs

Information contains

General applications

662,393

Application name, date, time of usage and cell ID

Voice call
Text message

54,440
5,607

Date, time, number of calling, duration and cell ID
Date, time, number of texting and cell ID

3.1.1 Application-level analysis
By default, a number of common applications are preinstalled on the mobile device by the manufacture,
such as: phonebook, clock and voice calling. With increased computing processing power and storage
space and almost 15,000 new mobile applications becoming available on the market every month, mobile
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users have the freedom of installing any additional applications on the device (Distimo 2010). From a
high-level perspective the general use of applications can provide a basic level of information on how the
mobile user utilises the device. Such basic information could be the name of the application, time, and
location of usage. Given the hypothesis that mobile users utilise their mobile applications differently (i.e.
two users utilise different applications in different time periods and at different locations), an experiment
was devised to explore the possibility of utilising application-level information for discriminating mobile
device users.
3.1.2 Application-specific analysis
The second experiment focussed upon utilising further information about the applications. Within many
applications the user connects to data that could provide additional discriminatory information. For
instance, when surfing the Internet, the Internet browser can capture all the URLs an individual accesses.
Unfortunately, due to limitations on the dataset (collected prior to data-based applications becoming
prevalent), the range of application-specific analysis that could be undertaken were limited to telephony
and text messaging.
The prior literature shows that calling behaviour has been studied several times in a network-based
environment with results demonstrating the ability to discriminate mobile phone users. Within a mobile
host environment, the availability of calling features does change slightly – for example, the IMSI
(International Mobile Subscriber Identity) is not a useful feature in a host-based solution. Furthermore,
although several studies suggested utilising a user’s location information, it was never been treated as a
calling feature. Therefore, it was interesting to identify the effectiveness of a new set of calling features,
which included the user’s location information.
Due to the enormous use of text messaging, with the UK alone sending more than 100 billion text
messages in 2010 (Ofcom 2010), the application is amongst the most widely used application on a
mobile device. Despite the high volume of text message usage, little research has been undertaken to
show how text messages may be used to detect abnormal usage in the mobile environment. Hence, it
was also deemed important to discover the possibility and usefulness of employing text messaging to
detect anomalous mobile user’s behaviours.
For methodological reasons: to maximise the number of participants within a reasonable timeframe, the
experiment employed 76 participants whose activities occurred during the period of 24/10/200420/11/2004. As not all participants started or finished the experiment at the same time, it was imperative
to isolate a sub-section of the dataset that maximised the number of participants and available data. The
methodology employed two types of profile techniques: static and dynamic. For the static profiling, each
individual dataset was divided into two halves: the first half was used for building the profile, and the
other half was utilised for testing. For the dynamic profiling, the profile contained 7/10/14 days of the
user’s most recent activities; the evaluation process was carried out on the same sub-dataset as for the
static experiment in order to provide a meaningful comparison. Given the highly variable nature of the
input data a smoothing function was applied. Rather than taking each individual result, the smoothing
function permitted the system to make a decision after a number of results were present (similar to a
winner-takes-all decision-based biometric fusion model). The basis for this approach was derived from
the descriptive statistics produced when analysing the data and the large variances observed. A dynamic
approach therefore seemed sensible to cope with the changing nature of the profile. Based on the
premise that the historical profile can be used to predict the probability of a current event, the following
formula illustrated in Equation 1 was devised. The equation also includes a weighting factor to allow for
more discriminative features to have a greater contribution (Wi) within the resulting score than less
discriminative features. Moreover, the equation also provides a mechanism to ensure all outputs are
bounded between 0 and 1 to assist in defining an appropriate threshold.

≥threshold

Equation 1: Alarm if:
Where:

i=The features of one chosen application (i.e. dialled number for telephony application)
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x=The value of Featurei (i.e. office telephone number and home telephone number)
M=Total number of values for Featurei
N=Total number of features
Wi=The weighting factor associated with Featurei (

)

Threshold= A predefined value according to each individual user

4. Experimental results
4.1 Application-level profiling
For the general applications, the following features were extracted from the dataset: application name,
date of initiation, and location of usage. As a total of 101 individual applications were used among the
chosen 76 users during the chosen period, a final sub-dataset for application-level applications with
30,428 entry logs was formed. Among these 101 applications, the phonebook, call logs and camera were
used by all participants. By using the proposed mathematical equation, a final set of EER’s (Equal Error
Rate) for users’ application-level usage is presented in Table 2. The best EER is 13.5% and it was
obtained by using the dynamic profile technique with 14 days of user activity with 6 log entries. In
comparison, the worst performance was achieved by using the dynamic profile technique with 7 days of
user activities with 1 log entry.
Table 2: Experimental results for application-level applications

Profile
technique

Static 14 days
Dynamic 14 days
Dynamic 10 days
Dynamic 7 days

1
21.1%
21.1%
22.1%
24.0%

2
17.4%
17.3%
17.8%
19.4%

Number of log entries
3
4
16.3%
14.9%
16.0%
14.5%
16.2%
14.6%
17.6%
15.9%

5
14.2%
13.9%
14.4%
15.3%

6
13.6%
13.5%
13.7%
14.4%

Selected experimental results for the best configuration of application-level usage are shown in Table 3.
The top 3 and bottom 3 users’ EERs represent the best and worst performance respectively. Further
analyses of the results show that 84% of all users have an EER less than 20%.
Table 3: Selected users’ performance for application-level applications with dynamic 14 days and 6 log
entries
User_ID
71
46

EER
0%
0%

12
66

0.5%
37.5%

2
68

39.3%
51.6%%

4.2 Application-specific profiling
4.2.1 Telephony
For the telephone call application, a subset of 71 users from the 76 participants used the application
during the aforementioned chosen period. During the same period, 2,317 unique telephone numbers
were dialled and the total number of calls made was 13,719. From iteration and optimisation, the
following features were chosen for each log: the telephone number, date and location of call. By using
the aforementioned mathematical formula with the selected features (all features were given the same
weighting factor), a final set of experiment results is shown in Table 4. The best result is an EER of 5.4%
and it was achieved by using the dynamic profile technique with user’s most recent 14 days activity and 6
log entries.
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Table 4: Experimental results for telephone call application

Profile technique

Static 14 days
Dynamic 14 days
Dynamic 10 days
Dynamic 7 days

1
9.6%
8.8%
9.6%
10.4%

Number of log entries
2
3
4
9.1%
7.9%
7.2%
8.1%
6.4%
6.4%
8.6%
8.1%
7.2%
8.8%
8.5%
7.3%

5
4.3%
6.3%
6.9%
7.0%

6
6.4%
5.4%
6.0%
6.2%

A selection of experimental results for the best set up of the telephone call application is presented in
Table 5. The best and worst performances for selected users are the top 3 and bottom 3 users
accordingly. Furthermore, 81.7% of users have an EER less than 10%.
Table 5: Selected users’ performance for telephone call application with Dynamic 14 days and 6 log
entries
User_ID
23

Performance
0%

43
61

0%
0%

64
50

20.6%
23.1%

8

39.5%

4.2.2 Text messaging
For the text messaging experiment, 22 users’ text messaging activities were available from the 76
participants, during the chosen period. The text messaging dataset contains 1,382 logs and 258 unique
texting numbers. For each text log, the following features were extracted: receiver’s telephone number,
date and location of texting. Due to certain participants having limited numbers of text messaging logs; a
maximum of 3 log entries were treated as one incident. By employing the aforementioned mathematical
formula and all text message’s features (all features were given the same weighting factor), the final
result for user’s text messaging application is shown in Table 6. The best result was an EER of 2.2% and
it was acquired by utilising the dynamic profile method with 14 days of user’s activities and 3 log entries.
Also, the performance improves considerably from 1 log entry to 2 log entries across all profiling
techniques.
Table 6: Experimental results for text messaging application

Profile technique

1
7.0%
5.7%
8.3%
10.7%

Static 14 days
Dynamic 14 days
Dynamic 10 days
Dynamic 7 days

Number of log entries
2
4.3%
2.6%
4.1%
5.7%

3
3.6%
2.2%
3.7%
3.8%

Table 7 shows a group of users’ performance for the best configuration of the text messaging application.
The top 3 and bottom 3 users’ EERs represent the best and worst performance respectively. In addition,
95.5% of all users have an EER smaller than 10%.
Table 7: Selected users’ performance for text messaging application with Dynamic 14 days and 6 log
entries
User_ID

Performance

13

0%

14

0%

18

0.2%

4

5.3%

2

8.4%

17

13.1%
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5. Discussion
The application name and location have proved valuable features that can provide sufficient
discriminatory information to prove useful in authentication. However, whilst this might identify many
misuse scenarios, it would not necessary identify all cases of misuse – particular those where a
colleague might temporarily misuse your device as the location information is likely to fall within the same
profile as the authorised user. So care is required in interrupting these results. The intra-application
approach should also help to specifically identify this type of misuse.
In general, dynamic profiling achieved a slightly better performance than the static profiling did. This is
reasonable as a dynamic profile contains a user’s most recent activities; hence it obtains a more accurate
detection. Furthermore, with a longer training set period, the performance is also improved. Hence, an
increased number of days (i.e. 18/22 days) of user activities as the training set should be examined to
find the optimum solution. Nonetheless, literature suggests users do change their usage pattern over a
long period of. A study by Flurry (2009) states that users only keep 67% of the applications over a 30
days period. Moreover, storage and processing issues should also be taken into consideration with larger
training. While a smoothing function treated more log entries as one incident, the performance also
improved accordingly. The smoothing function reduces the impact any single event might have and
seeks to take a more holistic approach to monitoring for misuse. The disadvantage of this approach is
that it takes a longer time for the system to make a decision; hence, an intruder could have more
opportunities to abuse a system and a certain amount of abuse could be missed by the security control.
Limitations in the dataset are also likely to have created certain difficulties. As the dataset was collected
in 2004, the number of mobile applications available for users to choose was limited; this resulted in a
large similarity of application-level application usage between mobile users and difficulty for any
classification methods. In contrast, in the early part of 2010, there were around 200,000 mobile
applications available (Distimo 2010). As mobile users have more options, their application-level usage
would arguably differ larger. Therefore, it would be easier to discriminate mobile users through their
application-level usage.
As shown by Table 4, the performance of the telephony application is very good – more than twice that of
the application-level profiling. This reinforces the hypothesis that knowing both the application and what
the user does with it, improves the chance of identifying individual users significantly. Moreover, mobile
users had a far larger set of telephone contacts (the numbers they can dial) compared with the number of
applications they had also makes the classification process easier because there are more identifiable
data points from which to discriminate. In comparison with other biometric authentication techniques such
as keystroke analysis, which has an average EER of 8%, the telephone experiment is within that
category of performance (Clarke and Furnell 2006).
As presented in Table 6, the results from the text messaging application were even better than those
achieved by the telephone call application, albeit with a smaller dataset. This may be caused by people
only sending text messages to very close contacts. Although only 30% of the participants used the text
messaging application in 2004, the situation has changed considerably: for UK alone, the volume of text
messaging traffic has increased by 290% since 2004 (Ofcom 2010). This indicates that the text
messaging based authentication method could serve a good proportion of the mobile users’ population.
From the results presented in this paper, it can be shown that both application-level and applicationspecific information can be used to authenticate mobile users. In addition, although it is more difficult to
profile certain users, more than 81% of all users’ performance was within the bounds of a behaviourbased biometric. Dynamic-based profiling technique provides the opportunity to develop a more
meaningful profile of user activities. This does however raise issues with regards to template aging and
ensuring the samples utilised in creating the template are all legitimate that will need to be addressed.
Furthermore, in comparison with previous research, which used computationally complicated neural
networks as the classification method (Li et al 2009; Li et al 2010), this approach employed a light weight
mathematical formula which saves a significant amount of processing power and storage space; this is
essential for handheld mobile devices as they have limited processing power and storage space.

6. Conclusions
The experiment shows that with an EER of 5.4%, 2.2% and 13.5% for the telephony, text messaging and
general application usage respectively, and these techniques are viable for a behaviour-based
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authentication mechanism within the mobile environment. The authentication process could be carried in
the background while mobile users utilise their applications; if several abnormal activities occurred within
a fixed time frame, further security methods would be initiated according to the level of the incident.
Future work will focus upon designing an authentication architecture that could accommodate the
aforementioned behaviour based authentication techniques. As the architecture works behind the scene,
little attention would be required from the mobile user and an intervention would only be needed when
anomalous application usage occurs. Hence, such an architecture would provide a transparent and
continuous protection for users. Furthermore, an operational system, which supports identity verification,
will be developed for the purpose of evaluation.
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